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ABSTRACT 
Few macroeconomic studies exist on the effects of taxes on 
international trade. Our hypothesis is that higher tax rates raise a country’s 
production costs, leading to a decrease in exports in the long run.  With panel data 
for 25 OECD countries, we use average effective tax rates on consumption, labor 
income and capital income to examine their impact on bilateral trade. We find that 
that all three types of taxes reduce the flow of international trade.  
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THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON TRADE COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Various groups advocate tax policies on the grounds that they will 
encourage international competitiveness.  For example, organizations such as the 
Pacific Northwest International Trade Association advocate policies aimed at 
decreasing the level of taxation in order to encourage international trade. On the 
other hand, some claim that increased taxes reduce budget deficits, leading to a 
reduction in trade deficits (e.g., Summers, 1988).  Surprisingly little research 
exists to substantiate the arguments of either side.  Few articles examine the role 
of national governments in international trade beyond their role in conducting 
commercial policy.  Questions on these impacts are likely to loom large as 
countries confront fiscal issues in an increasingly competitive international 
economy.  The aim of our study is to fill this important gap in the literature. 
I.   Previous literature 
The few studies that examine the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
policy on international trade mostly focus on government spending (e.g., Clarida 
and Findlay, 1992; Anwar, 1995 and 2001; Müller, 1998).  Most research on the 
effects of tax policy on trade has been theoretical (e.g., Helpman, 1976; Baxter, 
1992; Frenkel, Razin, and Sadka, 1991).   There have been one or two exceptions. 
Summers (1988) conducted an empirical investigation on the hypothesis that 
decreases in capital income taxes lead to capital inflows and a corresponding 
decrease in net exports, but did not find empirical support for this hypothesis.  
Keen and Syed (2006) estimated the effect of commodity and corporate income 
taxes on country net exports using panel data for 27 OECD countries.  Their 
hypothesis is that commodity taxes have no impact on trade whereas an increase 
in a source-based corporate tax would decrease domestic investment in favor of 
investment abroad, hence increasing the trade surplus in the short-run.  In the 
long-run, the return on firms’ investment abroad increases net income from 2 
 
 
abroad and leads to a decrease in the trade surplus. They concluded that their 
empirical results support their hypothesis. 
Our study examines the long-run impact of changes in three tax rates: 
consumption, labor income and capital income, on bilateral exports in a panel of 
25 OECD countries.  Our hypotheses are based upon the findings of Frenkel, 
Razin, and Sadka (1991). These authors showed theoretically that, to minimize 
their distortionary impact on trade, taxes should be levied on the least elastic 
goods and factors of production.  Since capital stock and labor supply are inelastic 
in the short run, tax incidence is likely to fall on capital owners and workers rather 
than being passed forward into factor costs. Effects on trade are likely to be small 
or insignificant in the short run.  However, long-run supply elasticities may be 
large enough to shift tax incidence back toward the demand side of the market, 
and into factor costs, thus forcing exporters to raise prices. In previous work, 
Beck and Coskuner (2007) found evidence to support this conjecture. Our study is 
directed at answering a follow-up question: Do exporters located in high-tax 
countries lose market share?  We investigate whether changes in different types of 
tax rates do, in fact, affect export volume in the long run and by how much.  
We hypothesize that the impacts of both labor income taxes and 
consumption taxes are through the labor supply channel because the reward to 
work effort is reduced. We expect the impact of consumption taxes to be less than 
that of labor income taxes because this channel is indirect. The literature suggests 
that capital has high supply elasticities in the long run (see, e.g., Mankiw and 
Wienzieral, 2006).  If so, the effect of capital income taxes should be greater than 
that of the other two taxes. However, the work of Keen and Syed suggests that 
capital outflows may disguise the impact of tax increases on exports.  Therefore, 
in addition to evaluating a broader range of taxes, we lengthen the time horizon to 3 
 
 
capture the full impact of tax changes (eight years versus three years).
1 We find 
that capital income tax increases do induce short run capital outflows, yet their 
cumulative effect is to reduce exports in most cases. We also find that labor 
income and consumption tax increases induce little or no increase in capital 
outflows and their cumulative impacts on exports are also negative. In a 
companion paper, we found additional support for these conclusions by 
estimating the impact of tax changes on capital flows as proxied by foreign direct 
investment (Beck and Chaves, 2011). We found that increases in capital income 
taxes have significantly positive impacts on foreign direct investment outflows 
whereas labor and consumption tax increases have negative or no significant 
impacts on outflows. 
We proxy tax rates with tax ratios (also known as average effective 
tax rates, i.e., AETRs). We update the tax ratio dataset, originally developed by 
Mendoza, et al. (1994) and expanded by Carey and Rabesona (2002) among 
others, to include 25 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006.   We use gravity models 
to estimate tax impacts on bilateral trade flows.  The next section describes our 
model specification. The following section describes the data, and in particular, 
the construction of the tax ratios. The last two sections discuss estimation results 
and conclusions. 
II.  Model and specification  
The gravity model has proven itself to be an empirical success and is 
general enough that it can be derived from a variety of different theoretical 
models (e.g., Bergstrand, 1985; 1989).  Specifications that have been used 
elsewhere in the literature have in common a measure of distance and measures of 
the relative sizes of the exporting and importing economies. Variants of the model 
                                                             
1 We include all capital income taxes, not only corporate income taxes, and we 




have included the real exchange rate and measures of price levels in each country 
(e.g., Bergstrand, 1985; 1989).  It is also common to include additional factors 
that influence international trade, such as country borders (McCallum, 1995), 
membership in preferential trading groups (Aitken, 1973), or shared social 
networks (Rauch, 2001).  
Our base specification, with tax rates included, is: 
 
ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠ijt
  ) =
𝗼0 + 𝗼1ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
  + 𝗼2 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡 +𝗼3 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +    𝗼4𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝗼5 ln𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡   +
𝗼6 ln𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑡   + 𝗼7ln𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡   + 𝗼8𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡  + 𝗼9𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 +
α10ln𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡   + α11ln𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 𝗼12ln𝑇𝑋   
 
Here Exportsijt
   is the value of aggregate export volume from country i to country 
j in year t. Real gross domestic product of exporting country i and importing 
country j in year t  is GDPit
   and  GDPjt respectively. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the physical 
distance between countries i and j. A dummy variable, Adjacentij, equals one if 
countries i and j share a physical border.  Costs of production in countries i and j 
are measured by producer price indices  PPIit and 𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑗𝑡 in year t. The real 
exchange rate, expressed as the value of country i’s currency in terms of country 
j’s currency in year t, is 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡.  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a matrix of dummy variables equal to 
unity in year t when countries i and j are both members of a trade organization.
2  
𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 is a dummy variable equal to unity when countries i and j share a 
common language,  𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡 are included for 
countries i and j to control for the effects of GDP fluctuations in each country.  
Tax effects are measured by TX which is denoted generally but is a vector 
                                                             
2 These include the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Union, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 5 
 
 
containing one or more lags of the tax ratios examined in this study.  The taxes in 
this vector include 𝑇𝐾𝑡, 𝑇𝐶𝑡, and 𝑇𝐿𝑡,   which are the differences of the tax rate in 
year t levied between country i and country j, on capital income, consumption, 
and labor income, respectively. Our hypothesis is that all taxes, when levied by 
the exporting country, lead to decreases in exports and all taxes levied by the 
importing country lead to greater imports.  We estimate this specification on 
subsamples as well as variations of it on the full sample to assess the robustness 
of our results. The development of these data will be discussed in the next section. 
III.  Data 
Tax Variables 
Tax ratios have advantages over two other tax measures that are also 
used in the literature: statutory tax rates and marginal effective tax rates 
(METRs). Tax ratios measure realized differences in actual tax burdens, unlike 
statutory tax rates (see Hajkova et al., 2006). For example, Egger and Radulescu 
(2008) observed that tax ratios are much more strongly correlated with FDI than 
statutory tax rates. Marginal effective tax rates are tax rates computed for 
hypothetical firms (see, e.g., Yoo, 2003; Hajkova et al., 2006; Egger, 2009). 
However, the advantage of tax ratios is that they provide data on taxes that have 
actually been paid and so incorporate all exemptions and deductions of which cost 
minimizing firms have taken advantage.  Although tax ratios far from perfect, is 
reasonable to expect that they are good proxies for the actual tax burdens faced by 
exporters. 
Tax ratios are constructed from tax revenue data published by the 
OECD. Tax revenue, divided into the components that are levied on consumption 
and labor and capital, form the numerators of the ratios.  The denominators are the 
base on which each of these taxes were levied. These are derived from each 
country’s national accounts data.  Mendoza et al. (1994) first calculated tax ratios 6 
 
 
for the G-7 countries for 1965-1988.
3  Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000) and, 
subsequently, Carey and Rabesona (2002) produced new measures of tax ratios 
using the SNA93 National Accounts data for 25 OECD countries for 1975-2000.  
We extended their database to cover 25 OECD countries from 1970-2006. Tables 
1 through 3 contain descriptive statistics. The tax variables used in our 
specification are tax differentials, defined as the difference between the exporting 
and the importing countries’ tax ratios in year t.
  
Trade Flows 
International trade data were obtained from the OECD International 
Trade by Commodity Statistics via OECD.stat.  These data are an unbalanced 
panel of annual data in current (nominal) domestic currency containing both 
export and import trade flows between each pair of the 25 OECD member 
countries.  These trade data are converted to real US dollar values using the 
OECD’s annual exchange rates and export deflators.  
Other Explanatory Variables   
Most additional data were obtained from the OECD.stat database, 
with a few exceptions. Real annual GDP was obtained from the OECD national 
accounts.  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the physical distance between the two most populous cities 
for any two country pairs.  Information on trade agreements for the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and, later, World Trade Organization 
(WTO) members were found on the WTO website.  Information on the years of 
membership in regional agreements, e.g., EEC, NAFTA, was obtained through 
the WTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System.  The real exchange 
rate,  𝐸𝑖𝑗 was calculated using the nominal exchange rate from the OECD’s 
Reference Series for Revenue Statistics (which calculates the annual exchange 
rate as the average of daily closing interbank rates of national markets) and was 
                                                             
3 Volkerink and de Haan (2000) provide an organized and thorough overview 
alongside their own calculations of these ratios. 7 
 
 
adjusted using the exporter and importer producer price index as suggested by 
Chinn (2006) in the following way:  




The industrial producer price index, 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖 is obtained from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics Database with missing values in some cases filled in using 
OECD.stat.  This measure of the price level is based on the revenue received by 
producers of goods and services so it is free from sales and excise taxes.  The 
business cycle variables are equal to real GDP in year t divided by the average of 
real GDP during the previous ten years for countries i and j, respectively (Beck 
and Coskuner, 2007). 
IV.  Estimation 
A panel gravity model should contain exporter and importer country 
fixed effects, time fixed effects, as well as time-invariant bilateral effects (Egger 
and Pfaffermayr, 2003). However, including fixed bilateral effects means that 
several variables familiar to gravity models that are static over time cannot be 
included in the specification, such as distance, adjacency, shared language, shared 
membership in trade agreements, etc.  According to Egger and Pfaffermayr 
(2003), including the fixed bilateral effects in lieu of these types of variables is 
often a better option.  We empirically test whether the fixed effects model is 
superior to the set of bilateral fixed variables available in this case following the 
procedure of Egger and Pfaffermayr. The results are in Table 4. 
Three versions of our baseline gravity model appear in the first three 
columns: the first includes fixed effects for each country pair but no other time-
invariant bilateral terms, the second is ordinary least squares (OLS) that also 
excludes time-invariant bilateral terms and contains main country fixed effects, 
which are two sets of dummy variables (one for exporting (i) country and one for 
importing (j) country), the third version is identical to the second but adds in the 8 
 
 
time-invariant bilateral terms of distance, adjacency, language and a dummy 
variable for trade agreement membership
4. The results of Wald tests lead to the 
conclusion that the first of these, the bilateral fixed effects model, is the superior 
model, as in Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003).   
In a subsequent paper, Egger (2005) also suggests additional 
measures to test the appropriateness of a fixed effects model.
5  First, a Hausman 
test results in a χ
2 statistic that is highly significant (column 1 of Table 4), 
indicating that a fixed effects model is preferred over random effects.  Second, a 
Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the set of bilateral fixed effects is equal 
to zero.  The third criterion, whether the H-T over-identification test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the extra instruments, or the exogenous variables in the 
model, are uncorrelated with the error term, was tested using the specification: 
lnExportsijt
  = 𝗼0
+ 𝗼1 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
  + 𝗼2 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡 +𝗼3 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 +    𝗼4𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗
+ 𝗼5 ln 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝗼6 ln 𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑗𝑡 + 𝗼7ln 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝗼8𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+ 𝗼9𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + α10 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ α11 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡 
Where the endogenous variables are 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
  , 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡
  , 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡, and in some specifications, also any of the tax ratios (the 
                                                             
4 This equals one if both countries belonged to the European Trade Association, 
which was the only trade agreement to not have changes in membership over the 
time span of this study.   
5 Under Egger’s criteria, the fixed effects model is appropriate if: (i) the Hausman 
test rejects the random effects model, (ii) “at least one of the tests of zero exporter 
and zero importer fixed effects rejects zero” and (iii) the H-T over-identification 
test rejects (the null hypothesis of which states that the instruments, or the 
exogenous variables in the model, are uncorrelated with the error term).  Our 
fixed effects model differs slightly from that of Egger in that a full set of bilateral 
fixed effects is used rather than just fixed effects for exporter and importer 
countries per the conclusions following Egger and Pfaffermeyer (2003). 9 
 
 
direct concerns regarding endogeneity are discussed further below).  The 
remaining variables are classified as exogenous and as such, in the H-T model 
they are used as instruments in order to calculate instrumented values for the 
endogenous variables.  The results of the Hausman specification and of the 
overidentification test appear in the last column of Table 4.  The tests reject the 
null hypothesis that the extra instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
Hence the fixed effects model is appropriate. 
Time Effects   
  Egger (2000) finds that time effects have a significant impact on 
his model and are thus included.  The results of likelihood ratio tests performed 
on each of the three models described above appear in Table 4.  These results 
show that the χ
2 statistic is highly significant in all three cases—indicating that the 
null hypothesis of restricting the year effects to zero is rejected.  Therefore time 
effects are included in this model, although these estimates are suppressed in the 
results reported in our tables.  
Endogeneity 
The dependent variable, bilateral exports in year t, could influence 
some of the independent variables in year t.  For example, a large increase in 
exports from country i in year t could lead to a significant increase in GDP of 
country i.  To deal with the issue of endogeneity, all of the time variant 
independent variables are lagged by one year in the final specification.  
Theoretically this is justified since the underlying factors affecting a country’s 
exports do so with a lag.  In the case of the exchange rate, we considered a longer 
lag because past empirical observation has indicated that the lag in the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the total exports may be significantly 
longer.  To determine the appropriate lag of the exchange rate, we used our 
baseline model below and compared the same specification with the exchange 
rate lagged 1, 2 and 3 years.  The value of the exchange rate lagged one year had 10 
 
 
the highest level of significance based on the t-statistic and thus we chose to use 
this for the final specification. 
Multicollinearity 
The concerns regarding collinearity are twofold.  First, the tax ratios 
are likely to be correlated with real GDP because they are constructed using a 
portion of GDP as the tax base.
6  Mendoza et al. (1997) use a lagged value of the 
tax ratios as instruments for the tax rates in order to avoid the issue.  Because the 
time-variant variables have already been lagged in order to avoid concerns over 
endogeneity, following Mendoza et al.’s solution would require that the tax ratios 
be lagged by two time periods if it was determined that the multicollinearity 
between taxes and GDP is of significant magnitude.  This is avoided, however 
because analysis of the data shows that although there is significant correlation 
between GDP and the tax ratios, the impact that this correlation has on the 
estimates from the model are minimal.
7  Possibly the more serious case of 
multicollinearity is between the different tax rates. Tax rates could be either 
positively or negatively correlated.  The positive correlation results if a 
government decides to use an expansionary or contractionary policy and thereby 
decreased or increased all types of taxes.  A negative correlation results from a 
government attempting to shift the tax burden from one base to another if 
minimum revenue is desired.  Analysis of the data shows that either of these 
explanations is plausible for different countries.  Countries mostly fall into two 
groups.  The first group is composed of those countries that have positively 
                                                             
6 This issue has been ignored by some authors, e.g., Bénassy-Quéré et al (2001).   
7 The analysis involved the comparison of several versions of the basic model 
each including combinations of tax ratios lagged by between one and ten years.   
Based on the fact that the t-statistics of the GDP and tax ratio coefficients and the 
R
2 value were little changed by these variations, there is little evidence that 
correlation between GDP and the tax ratios has a meaningful impact on the 
results.  11 
 
 
correlated labor and capital tax ratios, which are each negatively correlated with 
the consumption tax ratio.  It includes Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and the US.  The second group consists of 
countries for which all three tax ratios are positively correlated.  This group 
includes Australia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain and Sweden.   
Regardless of the sign, since tax ratios are shown to be correlated, 
further robustness checks were performed.  These involve comparing estimates 
when one or more variables is removed or when small portions of data are 
removed.  Coefficient estimates and significance levels were largely unchanged. 
Nevertheless, in Table 5 we report estimates for regressions where all three tax 
ratios are included and those where only one type of tax at a time is included. 
Heteroskedasticity 
The main specification for the gravity model is also tested for the 
presence of heteroskedasticity by calculating a modified Wald statistic for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of the fixed effect regression 
models.  In all three cases, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected.  As 
a result, all of the estimations included in this research are reported with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
Serial Correlation   
The specification was tested for evidence of first order serial 
correlation in the residuals of the heteroskedasticity-robust fixed effect regression 
models.  Without serial correlation present, the residuals from the regression of 
the first-differenced variables should have an autocorrelation of -0.5 (Wooldridge, 
2002).  To determine whether this is the case, we use a Wald test of whether in a 
regression of the lagged residuals on the current residuals the coefficient of the 
lagged residuals is equal to -0.5.  In all three cases, the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation was rejected.  A fixed effects model assumes that error components 12 
 
 
within a group (or country in the current case) are equally-well correlated with 
every other observation within the group (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  However, 
the presence of serial correlation in the fixed effects model shows that in this case 
that assumption is not valid.  Instead, there is evidence that the errors are 
clustered, meaning that observations for each exporting country are correlated, 
although they are not correlated across country pairs.  The same is true for the 
importing countries.  Since these groups overlap (one is not contained within 
another), the errors in the current research are subject to non-nested two-way 
clustering.  The assumptions under a model with clustered errors are more relaxed 
than under the fixed effects model since one still assumes that there is no 
correlation of the error terms across groups, but the errors within each group may 
have any correlation (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).   
Cluster-robust standard error estimators only converge to their true 
values as the number of clusters approaches infinity, which in practice has been 
shown to be around 50 (Nichols and Schaffer, 2007).  In addition, these estimators 
have been shown to be less accurate in cases when the cluster sizes are unequal.  
Both of these issues pose difficulties in the current study where there are 25 
countries (hence 25 clusters) and some countries have more complete time series 
than others.  Therefore, it is quite possible that cluster-robust standard error 
estimates are less accurate than those produced by the model that does not 
account for serial correlation.   
To evaluate how cluster-robust standard errors perform in a setting 
similar to our own, we turn to a paper by Cameron et al. (2006).  In it, the authors 
evaluate a method of estimating cluster-robust standard errors in the presence of 
multi-level clustering by comparing its hypothesis test rejection rates with those 
of other estimation methods for different numbers of clusters.  The results most 
relevant to the current research are those produced for a model with random 
effects common to each group and a heteroskedastic error term where the number 13 
 
 
of two-way clusters is equal to 30.  Although this analysis is not perfectly 
analogous to the current research, it sheds some light on the appropriateness of 
using this type of estimation procedure.  The authors find the most accurate 
rejection rates for the estimation models that assume independently and 
identically distributed errors (no serial correlation) or that allow for only one-way 
clustered errors.  Following this result, we believe that the standard errors 
produced by a two-way cluster-robust model would be farther from their true 
values than if the clustered errors are ignored.  Hence we ignore serial correlation 
in the current study. 
Robustness  
In order to capture the cumulative impact of the tax, each 
specification was tested with up to ten lags of the respective tax variable.  Only 
eight lags are retained based on the significance of the t-statistics.  Since there are 
other forms of the gravity model that have appeared in the literature, we estimated 
various specifications. In Table 8 we report estimates for specifications that 
dropped the two producer price indices, then the real exchange rate, then the two 
producer price indices plus the real exchange rate.  In Table 9, we added 
population variables, then we replaced aggregate real GDP with real GDP per 
capita. Our results were largely unchanged.  
V.  Results 
The results are reported in Table 5 for the full sample of 25 countries. 
In that table and in the discussion below, the short-run refers to the impact on 
exports from changes in the tax rate of the same year, which is instrumented by 
the tax rate in the year immediately preceding (TXt-1).  The cumulative impact 




All three tax rates have significant effects on bilateral trade flows and 
with the hypothesized signs in nearly all cases.  Nearly all of the other 
explanatory variables also exhibit the hypothesized values.  Real GDP for the 
exporting and importing country have consistently positive signs as expected.  
The business cycle variables, which are measures of the relative performance of 
the economy compared with the previous ten years, have negative effects in the 
case of the exporting countries and positive effects on importing countries as 
expected.  The price level and exchange rate variables have the same signs as they 
did in Bergstrand (1985; 1989) although the results in our study are stronger and 
more consistent.  Common membership in the EU and NAFTA was also shown to 
increase exports, which is consistent with the findings of Aitken (1973), Nilsson 
(2002) and Gould (1998).  The exception to the expected results was the 
coefficient on the WTO dummy variable which had an inconsistent sign across 
different specifications.
8   
The significance levels of estimated coefficients of the tax rate 
differentials indicate that tax changes take several years to affect trade volumes. 
This fits in with our hypothesis that capital and labor supply elasticities are high 
enough in the long run for taxes to be passed forward into input costs, thus 
affecting the high-tax country’s exports. Likewise, in most cases the cumulative 
impact of increases in the tax differential is to reduce exports, as hypothesized.  In 
Table 6 we examine whether our results hold up in subsamples. Subsample data 
include country exports to other countries in the same subsample but exclude 
exports elsewhere. Our first subsample drops countries with shorter time series to 
produce a balanced panel, then splits the balanced panel into a European 
subsample and a Pacific Rim subsample. Table 7 lists the countries included in 
each subsample. 
                                                             




Our hypothesis is that an increase in the difference in consumption 
tax rates has a cumulative negative effect on exports since it is (indirectly) a tax 
on work effort. We found this to be the case, whether we include the consumption 
tax rate differential singly or in conjunction with the capital and labor income tax 
rate differentials (see Table 5).  The cumulative impact is negative, indicating that 
countries with relatively high consumption taxes tend to export less.  The effects 
at a one year lag are more ambiguous. In regressions using the full data set there 
is no significant impact, but in subsample regressions (Table 6) there appears to 
be a significant negative short run impact especially the two subsamples 
dominated by European countries. There is also fairly consistent evidence across 
all regressions, including those in Tables 8 and 9, that there are significant 
impacts at lags 4 and 5 but these offset each other. The only exception is the 
Pacific Rim subsample. Nonetheless, the cumulative impact is still significantly 
negative in all cases. Our results extend those of Keen and Syed (2006) who 
found empirically that a consumption tax has no effect on exports within a three 
year horizon in their sample of 27 countries. However, since we include eight 
years of data, we allow time for consumption tax effects to be reflected in labor 
supply decisions, which affect labor costs thus impacting export volume.  
Labor Income Tax   
The estimates for the cumulative impact of increases in the labor 
income tax rate differential are negative whether included singly or in conjunction 
with the consumption tax rate and capital income tax rate differentials (Table 5).  
There appear to be significant negative impacts from increases in the labor 
income tax differential at lags 4 through 6 consistently throughout Tables 5-6 and 
8-9 with one exception: the European subsample. The European subsample shows 
that changes in labor income tax differentials have no impact on exports at all, 
either in the short run or the long run.  In contrast, the subsample of Pacific Rim 16 
 
 
countries shows that labor income tax increases have significantly negative 
impacts. Moreover, the cumulative impact for Pacific Rim countries is large 
compared to the overall sample. It is possible that this result reflects higher labor 
supply elasticities in Pacific Rim countries relative to European countries.  
Capital Income Tax 
The capital income tax differential has a statistically significant 
positive effect at lag 3 in most of the regressions; the exceptions are the Europe 
and Pacific Rim subsamples. In most cases, there is a negative impact around lag 
7 with the exception of the Pacific Rim subsample where it is positive. It is 
interesting to note that in the Pacific Rim subsample the magnitudes of impacts of 
both capital income and labor income taxes are quite a bit larger than those for the 
European sample. This is in accord with the intuition that Pacific Rim economies 
have more market flexibility than European economies do. Our results are also in 
accord with the conclusion of Keen and Syed, that in the short run an increase in 
capital income taxes creates financial outflows which are reflected in an increase 
in exports. Moreover, by using a longer horizon, our results show that tax 
increases eventually reduce exports. Our explanation is that, since the cost of 
capital increases, prices increase and exporters’ market share is reduced.  
The estimated tax rate coefficients are semi-elasticities, that is, the 
percentage change in exports with respect to a one percentage point change in the 
difference between the exporting and importing countries’ taxes.  For instance, 
the coefficient of the labor income tax ratio differential lagged one year is -0.0045 
and the cumulative coefficient is -0.0123 (column 1 of Table 8).  The 
interpretation of these coefficients is that if a country increases its average 
effective labor income tax by one percentage point while its trading partners keep 
their labor income taxes constant, the result will be a decrease in exports of 0.45 
percent in the current year and a cumulative decrease in exports of 1.23 percent 
over eight years.  To put this into perspective, using the most recent data available 17 
 
 
in this dataset from 2006, if the US increased its tax rate, measured by the tax 
ratio, from 23 percent of labor income to 24 percent of labor income while its 
trading partners left their tax rates untouched, US exports would decrease by 
0.0045 times $1.148 trillion (U.S. exports in 2006), or $5.2 billion in the year of 
the tax increase.  If the analysis is extended to the cumulative impact over eight 
years for the same level of exports it would be 0.0123 times $1.148 trillion, or a 
$14.1 billion cumulative decrease in exports. 
  
VI.  Conclusions 
The cumulative impact of increased taxes on exports, regardless of 
the factor on which they are levied, is significantly negative and sizable. These 
impacts are particularly strong for consumption and labor income taxes. The 
effects of increases in capital income tax differentials are cloaked by the financial 
outflows that they induce.  Tax effects on trade take several years to become 
apparent, as we hypothesized. Yet our conclusions are consistent across 
subsamples and specifications, countries with low taxes will tend to export more 
than countries with high taxes.  To summarize, our results indicate what many 
have asserted:  when it comes to international trade, taxes matter.  There is good 
reason to be concerned about the impacts of government tax policy on the 
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Consumption Tax Rate 
 
Observations  Years   Mean  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Std. Deviation 
Australia  37  1970-2006  12.69  10.79  12.48  14.96  1.05 
Austria  37  1970-2006  19.35  18.01  19.27  21.15  0.73 
Belgium  37  1970-2006  18.97  16.23  17.57  33.48  3.80 
Canada  37  1970-2006  15.18  12.87  15.30  18.39  1.44 
Czech Republic  14  1993-2006  17.31  16.06  17.27  19.08  1.13 
Denmark  36  1971-2006  25.50  20.50  25.36  28.00  2.03 
Finland  37  1970-2006  22.38  19.55  22.58  25.38  1.41 
France  37  1970-2006  17.91  16.13  18.05  20.44  1.09 
Germany  37  1970-2006  14.43  13.42  14.36  15.96  0.64 
Greece  37  1970-2006  13.93  11.88  13.85  16.13  1.05 
Hungary  16  1991-2006  23.33  21.31  23.02  25.54  1.22 
Ireland  37  1970-2006  20.21  16.22  21.08  22.88  1.85 
Italy  37  1970-2006  14.30  11.30  14.93  16.81  1.68 
Japan  37  1970-2006  7.02  6.13  6.72  8.30  0.65 
Korea  35  1972-2006  14.46  9.33  14.57  16.93  1.73 
Netherlands  37  1970-2006  17.33  16.00  17.28  19.21  0.82 
New Zealand  21  1986-2006  17.96  13.85  18.12  19.79  1.13 
Norway  37  1970-2006  24.73  22.26  24.49  26.93  1.31 
Poland  12  1995-2006  17.09  15.51  17.09  18.58  0.93 
Portugal  30  1977-2006  16.78  12.20  17.76  19.18  2.07 
Spain  37  1970-2006  11.53  6.58  13.62  15.33  3.43 
Sweden  37  1970-2006  19.84  16.53  20.55  21.96  1.50 
Switzerland  37  1970-2006  9.15  8.02  9.03  10.47  0.68 
UK  37  1970-2006  15.37  12.63  15.47  20.55  1.57 
US  37  1970-2006  6.64  5.98  6.60  7.54  0.42  
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Table 2   Descriptive Statistics for Labor Income Tax Rate 
 
Observations  Years  Mean  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Std. Deviation 
Australia  37  1970-2006  19.44  12.17  20.15  23.05  2.60 
Austria  37  1970-2006  37.15  30.28  36.94  42.28  3.75 
Belgium  37  1970-2006  39.94  30.51  41.64  44.05  3.71 
Canada  37  1970-2006  25.47  19.93  26.75  30.22  3.70 
Czech Republic  14  1993-2006  39.03  38.24  39.02  39.70  0.42 
Denmark  26  1981-2006  38.85  35.41  39.70  41.92  2.16 
Finland  37  1970-2006  38.58  26.04  38.79  49.47  6.47 
France  37  1970-2006  36.52  27.95  39.00  40.26  4.29 
Germany  37  1970-2006  35.13  29.39  35.60  37.27  1.72 
Greece  12  1995-2006  31.34  28.42  31.80  33.22  1.53 
Hungary  16  1991-2006  38.23  35.42  38.06  41.67  1.80 
Ireland  32  1975-2006  23.90  15.70  25.25  28.38  3.32 
Italy  37  1970-2006  32.12  13.54  33.93  42.17  7.70 
Japan  37  1970-2006  21.25  15.52  22.39  25.23  2.83 
Korea  32  1975-2006  7.59  2.02  8.26  15.17  4.00 
Netherlands  37  1980-2006  36.83  30.42  36.77  42.60  3.97 
New Zealand  21  1986-2006  24.85  21.98  24.48  28.67  1.81 
Norway  32  1975-2006  35.89  33.73  36.04  38.01  1.10 
Poland  15  1992-2006  9.69  6.16  10.22  12.51  2.07 
Portugal  12  1995-2006  26.98  25.41  27.12  28.48  1.04 
Spain  37  1970-2006  26.51  14.91  28.39  31.22  4.85 
Sweden  37  1970-2006  46.30  34.81  47.15  52.48  4.56 
Switzerland  37  1970-2006  21.87  15.08  22.70  28.38  2.50 
UK  32  1970-2006  23.62  21.70  23.57  25.94  1.22 
US  37  1970-2006  21.97  17.89  22.46  25.23  1.92  
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Table 3   Descriptive Statistics on Capital Income Tax Rate 
 
Observations  Years   Mean  Minimum  Median  Maximum  Std. Deviation 
Australia  37  1970-2006  29.65  22.17  30.55  32.70  2.80 
Austria  37  1970-2006  49.32  44.43  49.59  53.38  2.86 
Belgium  37  1970-2006  51.46  48.33  51.92  53.78  1.38 
Canada  37  1970-2006  36.82  32.27  37.56  39.81  2.35 
Czech Republic  14  1993-2006  49.59  48.77  49.33  50.83  0.70 
Denmark  26  1981-2006  55.00  51.19  55.78  58.03  2.16 
Finland  37  1970-2006  52.27  41.48  53.97  61.08  5.63 
France  37  1970-2006  47.92  42.08  49.36  51.16  3.00 
Germany  37  1970-2006  44.49  40.66  44.59  46.70  1.34 
Greece  12  1995-2006  41.12  38.74  41.12  42.55  1.22 
Hungary  16  1991-2006  52.64  50.38  52.86  54.99  1.59 
Ireland  32  1975-2006  39.47  29.93  41.14  44.19  3.94 
Italy  37  1970-2006  41.76  25.94  43.79  51.24  7.30 
Japan  37  1970-2006  26.78  21.60  27.67  30.94  2.63 
Korea  32  1975-2006  21.37  13.99  21.68  26.39  3.03 
Netherlands  37  1980-2006  47.79  42.65  47.53  52.63  3.11 
New Zealand  21  1986-2006  38.35  35.59  37.95  41.01  1.63 
Norway  32  1975-2006  51.88  49.73  51.76  54.13  1.08 
Poland  12  1995-2006  24.63  21.82  24.50  27.62  1.82 
Portugal  12  1995-2006  40.31  38.67  40.23  42.20  1.05 
Spain  37  1970-2006  34.86  22.16  38.46  41.56  6.48 
Sweden  37  1970-2006  56.91  46.43  57.71  62.25  4.21 
Switzerland  37  1970-2006  29.02  22.99  29.59  34.54  2.31 
UK  32  1970-2006  35.55  33.91  35.26  41.16  1.55 
US  37  1970-2006  27.15  24.08  27.27  29.93  1.59  
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Number of Observations  15,409  15,409  15,409  15,398 
Adj. R-Squared  0.966  0.734  0.889    
Root Mean Square Error  0.376  1.046  0.6771    
Akaike Information 
Criterion  14,986.1  45,207.3  31,809.3   
Bayesian Information 
Criterion  -20,687.6  -45,948.6  -32,581.2   
Hausman FE vs. RE χ2(44)  128.31
***       
Hausman Overidentification 
Test  χ2(6)        39.928
*** 
Wald tests:  
Exporter Effect  400.50***  134.84***  222.19***    
Importer Effect  253.04***  36.35***  128.65***    
Time Effect  52.02***  7.54***  15.31***    
Bilateral Effect        3768.94***    
Bilateral Fixed Effects  296.20***          
Estimation:  
Constant  -33.550***  -22.892***  -20.226***  -39.115*** 
ln GDPit-1  1.374***  1.082***  1.392***  1.674*** 
ln GDPjt-1  1.224***  0.916***  0.980***  1.318*** 
ln PPIit-1  -0.581***  -0.760***  -0.615***  -0.916*** 
ln PPIjt-1  0.100***  -0.018  0.087***  0.085*** 
ln Eijt-1  -0.147***  -0.110*  -0.096**  0.004 
Language        -1.039***  0.896** 
Adjacency        0.493***  1.472*** 
Distance        0.633***  0.000*** 
EUijt-1  0.200***  0.830***  0.123***  0.254*** 
WTOijt-1  -0.181**  0.105    -0.176    0.039 
NAFTAijt-1  0.128**  3.333***  0.559***  0.080 
EFTAijt-1        -0.422***    
ln BusCycle it-1  0.471***  0.494**  0.493***  0.179** 
ln BusCycle jt-1  0.666***  0.882***  1.124***  0.592*** 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 5  The Impact of Various Taxes on Bilateral Exports 
ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠ijt
  ) = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
  + 𝗼2 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡−1 +   𝗼3ln 
 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗼4 ln 𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼5 ln 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝗼6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼7 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + α8 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝗾𝑛
𝑚
𝑛=1   (𝑇𝑋 𝑖𝑡−𝑛
  − 𝑇𝑋 𝑗𝑡−𝑛
  )   






ln GDPit-1  1.3544***  1.5760***  1.3757***  1.3745*** 
ln GDPjt-1  1.0667***  1.1090***  1.0285***  1.0370*** 
ln PPIit-1  -0.5904***  -0.6573***  -0.6045***  -0.6244*** 
ln PPIjt-1  -0.1344  -0.1141  -0.0864  -0.0865 
ln Eijt-1  -0.2190***  -0.1793***  -0.2234***  -0.1665*** 
EUijt-1  0.1613***  0.1762***  0.1691***  0.1685*** 
NAFTAijt-1  0.1115***  0.1186**  0.1123***  0.1132*** 
lnBusCycle it-1  -0.4976**  -0.4765**  -0.4133**  -0.4522** 
lnBusCycle jt-1  0.4948**  0.3252  0.5188**  0.4288* 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  -0.0085  -0.0026     
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0024  0.0012     
TCit-3-TCjt-3  -0.0015  0.0012     
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0076**  -0.0076***     
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0086***  0.0079***     
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0047*  -0.0036*     
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0014  -0.0030     
TCit-8-TCjt-8  -0.0033  0.0002     
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  -0.0160**  -0.00630***     
TLit-1-TLjt-1  -0.0045*    -0.0040   
TLit-2-TLjt-2  0.0006    0.0012   
TLit-3-TLjt-3  0.0002    0.0007   
TLit-4-TLjt-4  -0.0041***    -0.0033**   
TLit-5-TLjt-5  -0.0022*    -0.0020   
TLit-6-TLjt-6  -0.0027*    -0.0031**   
TLit-7-TLjt-7  -0.0007    -0.0024*   
TLit-8-TLjt-8  0.0011    -0.0004   
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0123***    -0.0134***   
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0018      -0.0005 
TKit-2-TKjt-2  -0.0009      -0.0014 
TKit-3-TKjt-3  0.0036***      0.0033*** 
TKit-4-TKjt-4  -0.0012      -0.0021** 
TKit-5-TKjt-5  -0.0007      -0.0013 
TKit-6-TKjt-6  -0.0015      -0.0016* 
TKit-7-TKjt-7  -0.0022**      -0.0025*** 
TKit-8-TKjt-8  0.0009      -0.0002 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  -0.0001***      -0.00639*** 
Sample Size  9,071  10,720  9,364  9,195 
Country Pairs  600  600  600  600 
R-Squared  0.7630  0.7503  0.7566  0.7588 
RMSE  0.248  0.268  0.252  0.250 





Table 6  Subsample Results for Tax Effects on Exports 
ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠ijt
  ) = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
  + 𝗼2 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡−1 +   𝗼3ln 
 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗼4 ln 𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼5 ln 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝗼6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼7 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + α8 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝗾𝑛
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𝑛=1   (𝑇𝑋 𝑖𝑡−𝑛
  − 𝑇𝑋 𝑗𝑡−𝑛
  )   
 
Full Set  Balanced Set  Europe  Pacific Rim 
ln GDPit-1  1.3544***  1.4074***  1.1571***  1.8673*** 
ln GDPjt-1  1.0667***  1.0585***  0.9985***  0.9363*** 
ln PPIit-1  -0.5904***  -0.6111***  -0.3957**  -0.8399*** 
ln PPIjt-1  -0.1344  -0.1503  0.1417  -0.1003 
ln Eijt-1  -0.2190***  -0.2334***  -0.1897  -0.3160** 
EUijt-1  0.1613***  0.1721***  0.1348***   
NAFTAijt-1  0.1115***  0.1098***    0.4811*** 
lnBusCycle it-1  -0.4976**  -0.6437***  -0.4927  -1.6615*** 
lnBusCycle jt-1  0.4948**  0.5048**  0.5450  1.2303*** 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  -0.0085  -0.0165***  -0.0155**  -0.0279* 
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0024  0.0021  -0.0033  0.0100 
TCit-3-TCjt-3  -0.0015  0.0017  0.0076***  -0.0267** 
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0076**  -0.0079**  -0.0101**  0.0030 
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0086***  0.0060**  0.0014  0.0128 
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0047*  -0.0027  0.0011  -0.0036 
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0014  0.0005  -0.0004  0.0124 
TCit-8-TCjt-8  -0.0033  -0.0010  -0.0044  -0.0011 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  -0.0160**  -0.0178**  -0.0237***  -0.0211** 
TLit-1-TLjt-1  -0.0045*  -0.0057*  -0.0054*  -0.0243*** 
TLit-2-TLjt-2  0.0006  0.0003  -0.0006  0.0139** 
TLit-3-TLjt-3  0.0002  -0.0025  -0.0011  -0.0056 
TLit-4-TLjt-4  -0.0041***  -0.0031**  -0.0002  -0.0145* 
TLit-5-TLjt-5  -0.0022*  -0.0016  -0.0013  -0.0124* 
TLit-6-TLjt-6  -0.0027*  -0.0030*  -0.0004  -0.0169** 
TLit-7-TLjt-7  -0.0007  -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0298** 
TLit-8-TLjt-8  0.0011  0.0009  0.0015  0.0046 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0123***  -0.0150***  -0.00725  -0.0850*** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0018  0.0019  -0.0012  -0.0002 
TKit-2-TKjt-2  -0.0009  -0.0000  -0.0012  -0.0032 
TKit-3-TKjt-3  0.0036***  0.0030**  -0.0003  0.0065 
TKit-4-TKjt-4  -0.0012  -0.0012  -0.0013  0.0068 
TKit-5-TKjt-5  -0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0003  0.0037 
TKit-6-TKjt-6  -0.0015  -0.0011  -0.0018  -0.0004 
TKit-7-TKjt-7  -0.0022**  -0.0036***  -0.0033**  0.0116** 
TKit-8-TKjt-8  0.0009  0.0020  -0.0011  0.0030 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  -0.0001***  0.000665**  -0.0106*  0.0278*** 
Sample Size  9,071  6,999  3,453  496 
Country Pairs  600  306  156  20 
R-Squared  0.7630  0.7831  0.8491  0.8947 
RMSE  0.248  0.259  0.199  0.167 
* = 10%, ** = 5%, ***=1% significance levels. Cumulative = sum of pior 8 lags with F-test of joint significance.  




Table 7  Subsample Composition 
Subsamples  Countries Included  Countries Dropped 
  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
 
   
Full (25 countries)   




Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, 
Hungary, New Zealand, Poland, 
Portugal. 
Balanced (18 countries)   
   
 
 
Europe (13 countries) 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom.   
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal 
and U.S. 
   
 
 
Pacific Rim (5 countries) 
Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, and 
U.S.   
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,  
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
 




Table 8  Results after Dropping Price and Exchange Rate Variables 
ln(𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠ijt
  ) = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
  + 𝗼2 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡−1 +   𝗼3ln 
 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗼4 ln 𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼5 ln 𝐸𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝗼6𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼7 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + α8 ln 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝗾𝑛
24
𝑛=1   (𝑇𝑋 𝑖𝑡−𝑛
  − 𝑇𝑋 𝑗𝑡−𝑛
  )   
 
Base 
Specification  No PPI 
No Real 
Exchange Rate 
No PPI or Real 
Exchange Rate 
ln GDPit-1  1.3544***  1.2935***  1.3448***  1.2745*** 
ln GDPjt-1  1.0667***  1.0470***  1.0384***  1.0291*** 
ln PPIit-1  -0.5904*** 
 
-0.5747*** 
  ln PPIjt-1  -0.1344 
 
-0.1479 
  ln Eijt-1  -0.2190***  -0.1906*** 
    EUijt-1  0.1613***  0.1429***  0.1606***  0.1506*** 
NAFTAijt-1  0.1115***  0.0898  0.1132***  0.1050* 
lnBusCycle it-1  -0.4976**  -0.6113***  -0.5246**  -0.5442** 
lnBusCycle jt-1  0.4948**  0.5019**  0.5618**  0.5598** 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  -0.0085  -0.0100*  -0.0084  -0.0109** 
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0024  0.0016  0.0012  0.0020 
TCit-3-TCjt-3  -0.0015  -0.0006  -0.0018  -0.0025 
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0076**  -0.0095***  -0.0087**  -0.0085** 
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0086***  0.0078***  0.0073***  0.0074*** 
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0047*  -0.0041  -0.0036  -0.0039 
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0014  -0.0019  -0.0011  -0.0003 
TCit-8-TCjt-8  -0.0033  -0.0065**  -0.0019  -0.0058** 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  -0.0160**  -0.0232***  -0.0170**  -0.0225*** 
TLit-1-TLjt-1  -0.0045*  -0.0054**  -0.0032  -0.0055** 
TLit-2-TLjt-2  0.0006  0.0009  -0.0000  0.0002 
TLit-3-TLjt-3  0.0002  0.0004  -0.0003  0.0002 
TLit-4-TLjt-4  -0.0041***  -0.0039***  -0.0042***  -0.0027** 
TLit-5-TLjt-5  -0.0022*  -0.0029**  -0.0022*  -0.0009 
TLit-6-TLjt-6  -0.0027*  -0.0027*  -0.0011  -0.0026* 
TLit-7-TLjt-7  -0.0007  -0.0008  -0.0004  -0.0023* 
TLit-8-TLjt-8  0.0011  0.0014  0.0015  0.0012 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0123***  -0.0130***  -0.0099**  -0.0124** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0018  0.0005  0.0015  0.0004 
TKit-2-TKjt-2  -0.0009  -0.0003  -0.0003  0.0000 
TKit-3-TKjt-3  0.0036***  0.0036***  0.0038***  0.0034*** 
TKit-4-TKjt-4  -0.0012  -0.0013  -0.0012  -0.0015* 
TKit-5-TKjt-5  -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0022** 
TKit-6-TKjt-6  -0.0015  -0.0019*  -0.0020**  -0.0016* 
TKit-7-TKjt-7  -0.0022**  -0.0025***  -0.0019**  -0.0010 
TKit-8-TKjt-8  0.0009  0.0010  0.0006  0.0014 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  -0.0002***  -0.0016****       -0.0002***  -0.0011*** 
Sample Size  9,071  9,071  9,071  9,374 
Country Pairs  600  600  600  600 
R-Squared  0.7630  0.7525  0.7613  0.7493 
RMSE  0.248  0.253  0.249  0.257 




Table 9   Results Using Population and Real GDP per Capita 
ln𝐸𝑥𝑝ijt
  = 𝗼0 + 𝗼1 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
  + 𝗼2 ln𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑗𝑡−1 +   𝗼3ln 
 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗼4ln𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑗𝑡−1+ 𝗼5ln𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝗼6ln 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +
𝗼7ln𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + α8𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 +  α9  𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑡−1
  + α10  𝑙𝑛𝐵𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑗𝑡−1
    + ∑ 𝗾𝑛
24
𝑛=1 (𝑇𝑋𝑖𝑡−𝑛 
  − 𝑇𝑋𝑗𝑡−𝑛
  )  
 
Real GDP (Base)  Real GDP and Population  Real GDP per Capita 
ln GDPit-1  1.3544***  1.4348***  1.6503*** 
ln GDPjt-1  1.0667***  1.0532***  1.1267*** 
ln POPULATIONit-1    -0.0000***   
ln POPULATIONjt-1    0.0000   
ln PPIit-1  -0.5904***  -0.5925***  -0.5367*** 
ln PPIjt-1  -0.1344  -0.1396  -0.1023 
ln Eijt-1  -0.2190***  -0.2150***  -0.2281*** 
EUijt-1  0.1613***  0.1541***  0.0936*** 
NAFTAijt-1  0.1115***  0.1669  0.2923*** 
lnBusCycle it-1  -0.4976**  -0.5962***  -0.6084*** 
lnBusCycle jt-1  0.4948**  0.5208**  0.5715*** 
TCit-1-TCjt-1  -0.0085  -0.0091*  -0.0091* 
TCit-2-TCjt-2  0.0024  0.0025  0.0023 
TCit-3-TCjt-3  -0.0015  -0.0014  -0.0016 
TCit-4-TCjt-4  -0.0076**  -0.0090***  -0.0082** 
TCit-5-TCjt-5  0.0086***  0.0083***  0.0080*** 
TCit-6-TCjt-6  -0.0047*  -0.0048*  -0.0050* 
TCit-7-TCjt-7  -0.0014  -0.0013  -0.0018 
TCit-8-TCjt-8  -0.0033  -0.0047*  -0.0039 
TCi-TCj Cumulative
1  -0.0160**  -0.0195***  -0.0193*** 
TLit-1-TLjt-1  -0.0045*  -0.0051*  -0.0049* 
TLit-2-TLjt-2  0.0006  0.0006  0.0006 
TLit-3-TLjt-3  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001 
TLit-4-TLjt-4  -0.0041***  -0.0039***  -0.0041*** 
TLit-5-TLjt-5  -0.0022*  -0.0019  -0.0025** 
TLit-6-TLjt-6  -0.0027*  -0.0027*  -0.0029** 
TLit-7-TLjt-7  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0007 
TLit-8-TLjt-8  0.0011  0.0004  0.0006 
TLi-TLj Cumulative
1  -0.0123***  -0.0131***  -0.0138*** 
TKit-1-TKjt-1  0.0018  0.0016  0.0021 
TKit-2-TKjt-2  -0.0009  -0.0007  -0.0006 
TKit-3-TKjt-3  0.0036***  0.0038***  0.0037*** 
TKit-4-TKjt-4  -0.0012  -0.0012  -0.0009 
TKit-5-TKjt-5  -0.0007  -0.0007  -0.0007 
TKit-6-TKjt-6  -0.0015  -0.0015  -0.0015 
TKit-7-TKjt-7  -0.0022**  -0.0021**  -0.0022** 
TKit-8-TKjt-8  0.0009  0.0002  0.0009 
TKi-TKj Cumulative
1  -0.0002 ***  -0.0006***  0.0008*** 
Sample Size  9,071  9,071  9,071 
Country Pairs  600  600  600 
R-Squared  0.7630  0.7660  0.7686 
RMSE  0.248  0.246  0.245 
* = 10%, ** = 5%, ***=1% significance level. Cumulative = sum of prior 8 lags with F-test of joint significance. 
 